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Abstract— We analyze the problem of a renewable generator
who wants to sell its random generation in a two-stage market to
a number of strategic, but flexible, load serving entities (LSEs).
To offer an incentive to participate in the auction, the generator
promises to pay a penalty associated with any shortfall in
generation due to the uncertain nature of the traded resource.
We devise an auction mechanism that efficiently allocates
electricity among LSEs while eliciting their true valuations.
We show that the consumer surplus of the LSEs and expected
profit of the generator are positive, thereby creating a win-win
situation for all market participants.
I. INTRODUCTION
Renewable energy presents a clean, economic, and envi-
ronment friendly alternative to traditional sources of energy.
It is also thought of as a sustainable source that can solve,
or at least hedge against, any possible energy crisis that
might happen due to limited fossil fuel reserves. Yet, as
much benefits as renewables bring to the world, integrating
renewable energy in the existent power grid introduces new
challenges to the engineering and operation of the power
system [1]. One major issue that requires attention is the
need to design a trading institute that can accommodate
for the variability and uncertainty of supply associated with
renewable energy generation. The current electricity market
is designed for supplying the electricity demanded using
fossil fuel and nuclear energy based generators. Existing
markets can easily absorb renewable generation at small
quantities. However, when the random renewable sources
provide substantial portion of the demand, then the existing
market structure needs to be changed to ensure reliability
and smooth operations of the power grid.
Accordingly, in this paper, we devise an auctioning format
for renewable generation that builds on the current structure
of electricity market. We consider a renewable power gener-
ator selling renewable electricity to N load serving entities
(LSEs), or directly to consumers, in a two-stage electricity
market. In the day ahead market, LSEs report their inverse
demand function and the cost of buying electricity at the spot
price should there be a shortfall in supply. Accordingly, the
generator contracts to sell a specific amount of electricity to
each LSE. In the real time market, the renewable generation
is realized, and some LSEs might observe a shortage in sup-
ply. As an incentive to motivate LSEs to buy random energy,
the generator offers to compensate LSEs that experience a
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shortfall in the amount of electricity contracted for in the day
ahead market. We denote consumers who accept this deal to
be flexible. With this compensation in mind, the generator
will incur some random cost and has to decide on how much
electricity to assign to each LSE and, also, to specify how
much each LSE has to pay. In this decision process, the goal
is to maximize the social value generated while accounting
for the expected cost of compensation resulting from the
possibility of not generating the contracted power due to the
natural uncertainty in generation. This need for a reliable
decision under the inherent uncertainty calls for the the use
of stochastic programming with recourse. The employment
of this powerful mathematical tool to arrive at an efficient
allocation, which maximizes the welfare of all the parties
involved in this transaction is one major contribution of this
paper. The other important component of this work is the
payment scheme and the associated bound on the generator’s
profit. Before delving in the details of our work, we review
some of the relevant literature.
A. Prior Work
Current power systems were designed to generate, transmit
and distribute a fixed supply of electricity to consumers
whose demand exhibits some degree of uncertainty. Integrat-
ing renewable energy into this system creates new challenges
as it introduces uncertainty to the supply end of the sys-
tem, a feature the current power systems are not equipped
to handle [1]. References [2] and [3], and the references
therein, provide an overview of proposed modifications to
the operation and control of power systems that are needed
to accommodate renewables and fully harness its benefits.
One important aspect of integrating renewables is how to
trade renewable energy in the existing electricity market and
how this trade impacts its operation. During the last decade,
the problem of designing market mechanisms for renewable
energy received a lot of attention resulting in large literature.
The three main strands of related work study the important
problems of minimizing the imbalance costs, distributing
the imbalance costs among market participants, and devising
novel market mechanisms to manage the imbalance.
Managing the imbalance costs: Uncertainty in generation,
associated with renewable energy, adds to the challenge of
maintaining the reliability of the power grid. In the presence
of renewable generation, it is more likely for generators
to deviate from generation schedules that are designed to
meet the demand in real time, resulting in imbalance costs
that reduce the welfare of players in the system. In this
setting, papers [4], [5], [6] and [7] studied techniques that
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minimizes the cost of imbalance, that the generator faces, by
computing optimal renewable energy offering that accounts
for uncertainty in generation and market prices or engaging
in intra-day markets that allow the generator to modify its
day ahead offering as the delivery time approaches and better
forecasts become available. Another important technique to
manage grid stability is harnessing the flexibility of demand
to better maintain the balance of the grid. To this end, [8]
surveys flexible resources in electricity market. It did not
take long to recognize the importance of demand response
in the process of renewable energy integration [9]. Many
pricing schemes and incentive mechanisms were developed
to exploit demand side flexibility, [10], [11], [12] and [13]
sample this important line of research.
Distributing the imbalance costs: Meyn et al. [14] stud-
ied the competitive equilibrium of the stochastic two-stage
electricity market in the presence of wind generators and
computed the surplus of both suppliers and consumers. They
showed that, with deeper levels of penetration, variability in
generation, which requires more reserves to meet reliability
constraints, only reduces the surplus of consumers but not re-
newable generators. Based on this observation, they proposed
that generators carry the burden of obtaining reserves in the
day ahead market by making arrangements with conventional
generators or investing in storage. In the mean time, when-
ever imbalance costs can not be completely avoided and to
reduce the financial burden currently placed on consumers,
[15] proposes a cost-sharing mechanism which fairly divides
the cost of imbalance among the renewable generators that
fall short of their contracted amounts.
Energy offering strategies: Trading renewable generation
requires new market mechanisms that cater for the stochastic
nature of the traded resource. Bitar et al. [5] explicitly find
a formula for the optimal offering and quantitatively relates
profitability of one renewable generator to the uncertainty in
generation. In [16], Tang and Jain take one step farther by
considering an auction where multiple renewable generators
can sell their production to an aggregator, who acts as an
agent between the generators and electricity market.
So far, the market is assumed to be competitive so that
generators are price takers. Recently, the research community
became interested in understanding opportunities to exercise
market power by paying attention to the strategic behavior
of the parties involved in the market and device methods to
minimize or even eliminate such instances. Tang and Jain
show in [17] that the Locational Marginal Pricing mecha-
nism opens room for manipulation and propose a second-
price-auction-like mechanism for renewable generators to
bid their probability distributions in the electricity market.
[18] addresses this concern in a setting where conventional
generators are anticipated to game the system by modifying
their bids to increase their surplus, a situation that reduces
the social efficiency of the market.
In contrast to the existing body of research, this paper
promotes load flexibility to consumers who are open to the
possibility of not consuming electricity at all if they are
compensated accordingly. Consider, for example, an electric
vehicle (EV) that is 75% charged and is plugged in for
2 hours at a commercial charging station (say at a mall
or workplace garage). If the EV owner does not need the
vehicle fully charged, then it has a completely different kind
of flexibility. The owner can pick an option in which, if the
vehicle gets charged, the owner pays a small price, and if
the vehicle does not charge or is charged partially, then the
owner gets some compensation for unmet demand. Thus,
the generator offers random generation to customers who
can tolerate the lack of electricity at the time of delivery,
wherein the generator guarantees no monetary losses in this
transaction. In this paper, we study the associated optimiza-
tion and pricing problem in such a market. We believe that
utility scale storage, cloud servers, and certain non-critical
load serving enetities can participate in this market. This
paper is an expanded version of our previous work in [19];
we refer to related results in [19] whenever needed. Further,
due to space constraints, we present the proofs of our results
in archived version of this paper in [20].
B. Organization of the Paper
We first formulate the seller’s stochastic program in Sec-
tion II. In Section III, we analyze and solve the optimization
problem for the efficient allocation and show that it satisfies a
monotonically increasing property with respect to the strate-
gic parameter. Section IV reviews our pricing scheme, which
exploits monotonicity in allocation, and studies consumers’
surplus and seller’s profit. Simulation results are presented in
Section V. Finally, we provide concluding remarks in section
VI. All proofs are available in the appendices.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We have one generator who wants to sell its random gen-
eration to N LSEs. Let (Ω,F ,P) be a standard probability
space. Let w(ω) be the electricity generated by the generator
in the real time market. We use f : (−∞,∞) → [0,∞)
and F : (−∞,∞) → [0, 1] to denote the density function
and cumulative distribution function of the random variable
w(ω), respectively. They are given by
F (z) = P {w(ω) ≤ z} =
∫ z
−∞
f(w)dw.
We restrict f(z) = 0 for z ≤ 0 and f(z) > 0 for z >
0. Note that F is a monotonically increasing differentiable
function because it admits a density function with respect to
a Lebesgue measure on the real line.
The generator asks LSEs to report their bids in the day
ahead market. The i-th LSE responds by reporting a bid
that consists of two parameters, (ci, pii): ci represents the
price per unit electricity LSE i is willing to pay. This
corresponds to a perfectly elastic demand represented by a
constant inverse demand function. We make this assumption
to simplify the analysis of allocating an infinitely divisible
good, i.e. electricity, that has infinite dimensional bids. The
parameter pii is the penalty per unit of electricity paid by
the generator to LSE i who accepts to receive this amount
as a form of compensation in case of shortfall in the real
2
time market. Let xi denote the amount of power contracted
with LSE i in the day ahead market, where 1 ≤ i ≤ N . We
use yi(x;ω) to denote the shortfall of LSE i in the real time
market, which would be a function of the allocation x :=
(x1, . . . , xN ) and randomness ω. Define y := (y1, ..., yN ).
To simplify the analysis, we assume that there is no
cost to dump any excess generation in real time. Therefore,
the problem is only concerned with the case the realized
generation is less than or equal to the sum of allocated
electricity. Also, note that there are no network constraints
in this formulation, where we assume that the transmission
capacity is large enough to support the committed allocation.
A. Key Questions for the Auction Design
The generator designs a mechanism that determines: (i)
the allocation x∗ of electricity in the day ahead market and
the shortfall y∗ in the real time market, and (ii) the prices
p∗i that each LSE i needs to pay in exchange of x
∗
i units of
electricity. Define p∗ = (p∗1, . . . , p
∗
N ). The tuple (x
∗, y∗, p∗)
denotes the mechanism designed by the generator. Since the
allocation and the prices are based on the bids, buyers have
motive to lie about their bids {(ci, pii)}Ni=1, if that improves
their (expected) payoffs. In this case, it is desirable to devise
the mechanism (x∗, y∗, p∗) which satisfies some desirable
properties stated below.
We study here the case in which LSEs strategically choose
c = (c1, . . . , cN ), whereas pi = (pi1, . . . , piN ) is held constant
and is known in advance. A typical example of this scenario
is where electricity is procured from traditional generators
in real time market to make up for the shortfall at known
prices. The utility ui of LSE i is a function of the allocation
xi and the price pi, and takes this quasilinear form
ui(xi, pi) = cixi − pi.
The LSEs, as rational agents, act to maximize their individual
utility functions, which, as the last equation shows, depend
on the bids of all LSEs through the allocation and price. Let
s be the true value of all LSEs and denote the utility of LSE
i at x∗i and p
∗
i when it bids sˆi and the others bid sˆ−i as
Ui(sˆi, sˆ−i) = cix∗i (sˆi, sˆ−i)− p∗i (sˆi, sˆ−i).
On the other hand, the seller’s expected utility at
(x∗, y∗, p∗) is given by
U0(sˆ) =
N∑
i=1
p∗i (sˆi, sˆ−i)−
N∑
i=1
E [piiy
∗
i (x
∗(sˆi, sˆ−i), ω)] .
The goal of the generator is to devise the mechanism
(x∗, y∗, p∗) that is efficient, incentive compatible in dominant
strategy, individually rational, and budget balanced. We
formally define these properties below:
Definition 1: A mechanism (x∗, y∗, p∗) is efficient if the
allocation (x∗, y∗) maximizes social welfare W (x, y) =∑N
i=1
(
cixi(s)− E
[
piiyi(x(s);ω)
])
.
Definition 2: A mechanism (x∗, y∗, p∗) is incentive com-
patible in dominant strategy if for every LSE i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
if it reports sˆi while its true bid is si, then
Ui(si, sˆ−i) ≥ Ui(sˆi, sˆ−i),
for all si, sˆi, and sˆ−i.
Definition 3: A mechanism (x∗, y∗, p∗) is individually
rational if for every LSE i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
Ui(si, s−i) ≥ 0 for all si and s−i.
Definition 4: A mechanism (x∗, y∗, p∗) is budget bal-
anced if the generator’s payoff satisfies U0(s) ≥ 0 for any
bid vector s.
B. Solution Approach
To devise an efficient mechanism, the generator formulates
a stochastic program to compute an allocation that maximizes
social welfare (see Definition 1). This translates to the
following two-stage optimization problem with recourse:
max
x∈RN ,y:RN×Ω→RN
{
N∑
i=1
cixi − E
[
N∑
i=1
piiyi(x;ω)
]}
subject to xi ≥ 0, ∀i
0 ≤ yi(x;ω) ≤ xi, ∀i,
N∑
i=1
yi(x;ω) =
( N∑
i=1
xi − w(ω)
)+
.
(1)
where the expectation is with respect to w. Since the utility of
each LSE is affine in its bid parameter ci, we use Myerson’s
payment scheme [21] to determine the payment structure p∗.
We show that for this problem, this payment scheme, coupled
with the allocation computed by solving (1), induces a mech-
anism (x∗, y∗, p∗) that is incentive compatibile in dominant
strategies, individually rational, and budget balanced.
III. OPTIMAL ALLOCATION AND SHORTFALL SCHEME
The two-stage stochastic program formulated in (1) is
solved in our previous work [19]. We review the main
steps in deriving the allocation and shortfall scheme for
completeness here. We solve (1) backwards in two steps.
First we minimize the cost function of the second stage
with respect to the decision variable y subject to relevant
constraints. Then, we use the optimal solution of the second
stage to compute the optimal allocation among the competing
LSEs. We first define some notation and make the following
assumption on the bids of the LSEs.
Define c0 = pi0 = 0. For i 6= N , let αi and βi be defined
as
αi :=
ci+1(pii − pii−1) + ci−1(pii+1 − pii)
pii+1 − pii−1 , (2)
βi := ci+1 − (pii+1 − pii).
Let αN = cN−1 and βN = cN−1 + (piN − piN−1).
Assumption 1: 1) The penalty is ordered such that
pi1 < pi2 < ... < piN .
2) The value of LSE i satisfies
αi < ci < βi.
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If all agents have distinct penalty parameter, then As-
sumption 1 (1) can be made without loss of generality. If
Assumption 1 (2) is violated by LSE i, then the generator
will allocate either zero or infinite units of electricity to LSE
i. We place this assumption on all the statements proved in
the paper. The following theorem presents the solution to this
stochastic program, the proof of which is outlined in III-A
and III-B.
Theorem 1: Consider the two-stage stochastic program
in (1) in which the bids satisfy Assumption 1. The optimal
shortfall y∗, as a function of allocation x and randomness ω,
is given by
y∗(x;ω) =

(
x1, x2, ..., xkx(ω)−1, ϕkx(ω)(x)− w(ω)
0, 0, ..., 0
)
if 1N · x > w(ω)
0 else
,
(3)
where kx(ω) is given by
kx(ω) =
{
i ϕi+1(x) ≤ w(ω) < ϕi(x)
N w(ω) ≤ xN
, (4)
and ϕj(x) =
∑N
k=j xk = xj + . . . + xN . The optimal
allocation x∗ is given by
x∗i = F
−1
(
ci − ci−1
pii − pii−1
)
− F−1
(
ci+1 − ci
pii+1 − pii
)
(5)
x∗N = F
−1
(
cN − cN−1
piN − piN−1
)
.
(6)
An outline of the proof of the theorem is provided below.
A. Stage 2 Optimization Problem
Given a realization of wind generation, w(ω), we first
minimize the linear cost objective inside the expectation by
solving the following linear program:
Q(x;ω) = min
y
pi · y(x;ω)
s.t. 0 ≤ y(x;ω) ≤ x,
1N · y(x;ω) =
(
1N · x− w(ω)
)+
,
(7)
where 1N is a column vector of N ones. Recall that pi1 <
pi2 < ... < piN . The optimal solution to this linear program,
y∗(x;ω) is a random vector given by
y∗(x;ω) =

(
x1, x2, ..., xkx(ω)−1, ϕkx(ω)(x)− w(ω),
0, 0, ..., 0
)
if 1N · x > w(ω)
0 else
where kx(ω) is given in (4). Note that the components of
y are zeros for all indices that are greater than kx(ω). The
rationale behind this solution is when wind is generated, it
is more cost effective to allocate the available wind to the
more expensive buyers and compensate the less expensive
LSEs.
We use y∗(x;ω) to compute the optimal value of the
objective function of the linear program in (7). To simplify
the computation we use the indicator function, 1{·}, which
takes the value 1 if {·} is satisfied and 0 otherwise. Then,
the optimal value can be written as
Q(x;ω) =
N∑
i=1
piiy
∗
i (x;ω)
=
N∑
i=1
pii
[
1{kx(ω)>i}xi + 1{kx(ω)=i}ϕi(x)
− 1{kx(ω)=i}w(ω)
]
, (8)
where ϕi is as defined in (4). We proceed to the next task,
computing the expected value of the second stage,
V (x) := E [Q(x;ω)] .
We define the function G : [0,∞)→ R to be
G(z) =
∫ z
0
wf(w)dw. (9)
and use it to evaluate V (x).
Lemma 2: Recall that ϕj(x) =
∑N
k=j xk. The second
stage expected value function, V (x) = E [Q(x;ω)], is
V (x) =
N∑
i=1
piixiF
(
ϕi+1(x)
)
+
N∑
i=1
piiϕi(x)F
(
ϕi(x)
)
−
N∑
i=1
piiϕi(x)F
(
ϕi+1(x)
)
−
N∑
i=1
piiG
(
ϕi(x)
)
+
N∑
i=1
piiG
(
ϕi+1(x)
)
. (10)
Further, V is a deterministic and convex function of x.
Proof: See Appendix I.
Having all the terms of the second stage expected value
as functions of x, we finished the formulation of the cost
function of the first stage and we can proceed to find the
optimal, welfare maximizing, allocation x∗.
B. Stage 1 Optimization Problem
To solve the first stage optimization problem, we first
rewrite it as a minimization of a cost function. This cost
function is composed of the expected cost of serving the
shortfall in generation at the second stage minus the total
value resulting from the allocation. This minimization prob-
lem is written as:
min
x
h(x) := −c · x+ V (x)
subject to x ≥ 0, x ∈ RN .
We note that this is just a problem of minimizing a convex
objective over a positive orthant. The derivative ∂h∂xi is
computed as
∂h
∂xi
= −ci+
i∑
j=1
(pij−pij−1)F
(
ϕj(x)
)
1 ≤ i ≤ N. (11)
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The necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality given
in Example 2.1.1 from [22] state that at the optimal al-
location, x∗, the derivative of h(x) is nonnegative, that is
∂h
∂xi
|x∗ ≥ 0. This implies that
x∗ is optimal⇐⇒ ci ≤
i∑
j=1
(pij − pij−1)F
(
ϕj(x
∗)
)
. (12)
Furthermore,
1) if x∗i > 0, then ci =
∑i
j=1(pij − pij−1)F
(
ϕj(x
∗)
)
;
2) if ci <
∑i
j=1(pij − pij−1)F
(
ϕj(x
∗)
)
, then x∗i = 0.
If x∗ is strictly positive, the following equations are
satisfied
x∗i + . . .+ x
∗
N = F
−1
(
ci − ci−1
pii − pii−1
)
, 1 ≤ i ≤ N. (13)
By solving the equations above, we arrive at the formula of
x∗ given in (5)-(6). The next Lemma provides conditions for
LSE to be allocated zero or positive amount of electricity.
Lemma 3: Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, the
allocation x∗i is strictly positive for all i.
Proof: Refer to Appendix II.
This proves Theorem 1. We now turn our attention to the
pricing scheme in the next section.
IV. THE PRICING SCHEME
Recall that the LSEs bid their inverse demand functions to
the renewable generator and the penalty for the shortfall is
known. In such a situation, the LSEs have inherent incentives
to misrepresent their true costs or penalty to maximize their
profit. Thus, LSEs can be strategic in deciding on their bids.
Under such a situation, it is desired to devise allocation
and pricing policies jointly that can induce the LSEs to
bid their true parameters. Here we show that the allocation
policy determined in Theorem 1, together with a pricing
policy based on Myerson’s lemma [21], [23], induces truthful
behavior in dominant strategy with respect to the willingness
to pay parameter.
To simplify the analysis, we first study the problem in
which pi1, . . . , piN are the non-strategic components of the
LSEs’ bids, and c1, . . . , cN are strategically chosen by the
bidders to maximize their utilities. The motivation to study
this problem is that ci captures the value generated by
consumption of one unit of electricity by LSE i, pii would
represent the amount LSE i would pay to procure the
shortfall from a traditional gas-fired or coal based generator
to meet the demand.
For next result, let us write the optimal allocation x∗
as a function of the bids c. For clarity, let c−i =
(c1, ..., ci−1, ci+1, ..., cN ), and we write x∗i (s, c−i) to denote
the optimal allocation when LSE i bids s and all other LSEs
bid c−i. In the next lemma, we show that as an LSE increases
its bid from 0 to βi, its optimal allocation is monotonically
increasing.
Lemma 4: For fixed c−i, the optimal allocation
x∗i (s, c−i) is monotonically increasing in s ∈ (0, βi) for all
1 ≤ i ≤ N .
Proof: See Appendix III.
Myerson’s Lemma [21] states that for a monotonic allo-
cation function, the payment rule given by the expression
p∗i (ci, c−i) =
∫ ci
0
s
d
ds
x∗i (s, c−i)ds, 1 ≤ i ≤ N
leads to incentive compatibility in dominant strategies in
a single-parameter auction where valuation is linear in the
bidding parameter (which is the case here). We evaluate this
integral in the following theorem.
Theorem 5: Given the allocation function x∗(ci, c−i),
define the payment scheme p∗i as
p∗i (ci, c−i) = cix
∗
i (ci, c−i)
+ (pii+1 − pii−1)G
(
F−1
(
ci+1 − ci−1
pii+1 − pii−1
))
− (pii+1 − pii)G
(
F−1
(
ci+1 − ci
pii+1 − pii
))
− (pii − pii−1)G
(
F−1
(
ci − ci−1
pii − pii−1
))
, (14)
p∗N (cN , c−N ) = cNx
∗
N (cN , c−N )
− (piN − piN−1)G
(
F−1
(
cN − cN−1
piN − piN−1
))
,
(15)
where G(·) is defined in (9) and 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1. Then, the
joint allocation payment scheme (x∗, p∗) induces each LSE
to bid truthfully in dominant strategies.
Proof: The proof comprises evaluating the integral to
compute the payment in accordance with Myerson’s lemma
and showing that no matter what other LSEs bid, the utility
of LSE i is maximized if it bids ci. We refer to Appendix
IV for a detailed proof.
As one can observe in the expression for the payment
scheme, each LSE pays the cost according to the product
of its allocation and its reported valuation, but it receives a
discount that is precisely based on bids of the preceding LSE
and the succeeding LSE.
A. Individual Rationality of the Mechanism
In this subsection, we prove that the LSEs are paying less
than their valuation, which implies voluntary participation of
players in the market – this is the Individual Rationality (IR)
property in Definition 3.
Lemma 6: For all i, the price player i pays for electricity
is not more than its valuation. that is,
p∗i (ci, c−i) ≤ cix∗i (ci, c−i).
Proof: The proof is a direct consequence of the fact that G◦
F−1 : [0, 1)→ [0,∞) is a convex monotonically increasing
function. We present the complete proof in Appendix V.
The following theorem proves that the mechanism
(x∗, y∗, p∗) is individually rational from the perspective of
buyers.
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Theorem 7: The mechanism (x∗, y∗, p∗) is individually
rational, that is Ui(ci, c−i) ≥ 0 for all LSE i.
Proof: From lemma 6, we conclude that Ui(ci, c−i) =
cix
∗
i (ci, c−i) − p∗i (ci, c−i) ≥ 0. Thus, the mechanism is
individually rational.
We just showed that flexible buyers lose nothing when
they buy the random generation through the defined auction.
Since the generator is taking the financial responsibility
of compensating any possible shortfall in generation, it is
possible for generators to make losses with some probability.
Expected profit of the generator measures the long term aver-
age of losses and profits the generator expects to make.Next,
we study the expected payoff of the generator.
B. Budget Balancedness of the Mechanism
Recall Definition 4: A mecahnism is budget balanced if
there is no net transfer from the mechanism to the players.
In our case, this translates to the generator ending with
nonnegative utility. The generator’s expected payoff is
U∗0 := U
∗
0 (c) =
N∑
i=1
(
p∗i − E [piiy∗i (x∗;ω)]
)
.
In the next theorem, we present a lower bound on the profit
of the generator.
Theorem 8: Suppose that F (x) is convex over (0, x∗N ).
Then, the generator’s expected profit is lower bounded by
U∗0 ≥
N−1∑
i=1
[(
ci − piiF (ϕi(x∗)
)
x∗i (ci, c−i) +
pii−1(ci − αi)
pii − pii−1
×
[
F−1
( ci+1 − ci−1
pii+1 − pii−1
)
− F−1
( ci+1 − ci
pii+1 − pii
)]]
+
[ cN−1piN
piN − piN−1 −
cN + cN−1
2
piN−1
piN − piN−1
]
x∗N (cN , c−N ).
Proof: We break the process of bounding U∗0 by lower
bounding p∗i − pi∗iE [y∗i (x∗;ω)] for every 1 ≤ i ≤ N in
Lemma 9.
Lemma 9: Under the mechanism (x∗, y∗, p∗), the gener-
ator’s expected payoff from each LSE i ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1} is
lower bounded by
p∗i (ci, c−i)−E [piiy∗i (x∗;ω)] ≥
(
ci − piiF (ϕi(x∗)
)
x∗i (ci, c−i)
+
pii−1(ci − αi)
pii − pii−1
[
F−1
( ci+1 − ci−1
pii+1 − pii−1
)
− F−1
( ci+1 − ci
pii+1 − pii
)]
.
Moreover, if F (x) is convex over (0, x∗N ), then
p∗N (cN , c−N )−E [piNy∗N (x∗;ω)] ≥[ piNcN−1
piN − piN−1 −
cN + cN−1
2
piN−1
piN − piN−1
]
x∗N (cN , c−N ).
Proof: The proof simply follows from some algebraic ma-
nipulations. First, the expected value of the optimal recourse
variable, y∗i (x;ω) is computed to be
E [y∗i (x;ω)] = xiF
(
ϕi+1(x)
)
+ ϕi(x)F
(
ϕi(x)
)
− ϕi(x)F
(
ϕi+1(x)
)−G(ϕi(x))
+G
(
ϕi+1(x)
)
. (16)
Using (16) and the payments from Theorem 5, and by
exploiting the convexity of G ◦ F−1, we arrive at the lower
bound. See Appendix VI for the proof.
Therefore, the total expected payoff, i.e. the generator’s
expected profit, is bounded by the sum of the bounds in
Lemma 9. Under certain additional assumptions on (ci, pii),
we can show that the expected profit is strictly positive.
Lemma 10: If ci/pii < ci−1/pii−1 for all 2 ≤ i ≤ N ,
then U∗0 > 0. Consequently, the mechanism (x
∗, y∗, p∗) is
budget balanced.
Proof: Refer to Appendix VII.
We evaluate the expected profit and the lower bound for
the case where generation is distributed according to Weibull
distribution in the next section. We note that our mechanism
is budget balanced in expectation as we are concerned here
with the expected profit. We also note that it is possible
to accrue loss from some runs of the auction, though the
long term average (of independent auctions) will always be
positive.
V. NUMERICAL SIMULATION
In this section, we simulate an instance of the auction
where the bids are held fixed and the generation is assumed
random. First, consider η ∈ (0, 1) and let
ci =
1− ηi
1− η c1, pii = ipi1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
Let us define cˆ = c1pi1 < 1. With this definition, we get
ci+1 − ci
pii+1 − pii =
ηi+1 − ηi
1− η
c1
pi1
= ηicˆ.
We note that (c, pi) thus defined satisfy Assumption 1. The
optimal allocation for LSE i, where 1 ≤ i ≤ N , is
x∗i = F
−1
(
ηi−1cˆ
)
− F−1
(
ηicˆ
)
, x∗N = F
−1
(
ηN−1cˆ
)
.
As for the source of renewable energy, we assume an
aggregated wind generated electricity. Bradbury showed in
[24] that such generation follows a Weibull distribution,
which is characterized by a probability density function f(w)
of the form
f(w) =
k
λ
(w
λ
)k−1
exp
(
−
(w
λ
)k)
for w ≥ 0,
where k is the shape parameter and λ is the scale param-
eter, which is proportional to the mean power output. The
corresponding cumulative distribution function is
F (w) = 1− exp
(
−
(w
λ
)k)
for w ≥ 0.
In the same paper, it was shown that k increases from 1.7 to 3
as the power output of more wind turbines are accumulated.
For ease of exposition, we adopt k = 2 in our computations.
The corresponding λ is found to be 1509 kW, when the mean
power is 1337 kW.
In order to calculate the components (x∗, p∗) of our
DSIC mechanism , we need to evaluate both F−1(ρ) and
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G(z) for the Weibull distribution. We note that F (w) is
a monotonically increasing function, therefore, it has an
inverse function, which can be easily shown to be,
F−1(ρ) = λ k
√
ln
(
1
1− ρ
)
= 1509
√
ln
(
1
1− ρ
)
kW.
In our case, k = 2, computing G(z) involves the evaluation
of the following integral,
G(z) =
2
λ2
∫ z
0
w2e−(
w
λ )
2
dw = λ
∫ z2
λ2
0
ν
3
2−1e−νdν
= λγ
(
3
2
,
z2
λ2
)
,
where we used the substitution ν = w
2
λ2 , and γ is the lower
incomplete gamma function. This yields
G ◦ F−1(ρ) = λγ
(
3
2
,
1
1− ρ
)
.
We simulate the case N = 5 for different values of η
while fixing cˆ = 10/12. Figure 1 and Figure 2 illustrate how
each buyer’s allocation and payment change in response.
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Fig. 1. Allocation as a function of η.
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Fig. 2. Myerson’s Payments as a function of η.
We note the contrary relationship between x∗1 and x
∗
5.
When η is low, the components of c are close to each other,
so more power is allocated to player 1, the cheapest player,
and since most of the generation is allocated to him, not
much is left to the other players. On the other hand, as η
increases, the components of c spread out and the allocation
assigns more energy to the LSEs with higher willingness
to pay, in this case LSE 5. Yet, LSE 5, who has the highest
valuation for the energy, has to pay far more than what player
1 has to pay per unit kWh. This higher payment makes up
for the high expected compensation due to his high penalty
pi5. This trend is clear in Figure 3 that shows the per unit
prices of energy for all the LSEs.
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Fig. 3. Prices per unit energy as a function of η.
It is worth mentioning that despite this non-uniform pric-
ing, players are receiving a discount for their flexibility and
their utilities are at their maximum by the DSIC feature of
our proposed mechanism. We define the discount as
discount = 100
(cix∗i − p∗i
cix∗i
)
%,
The discounts are illustrated in Figure 4, where we see that
even the expensive player is motivated by a decent amount of
savings. Figure 5 depicts the positive surplus of the players
in this mechanism.
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Fig. 4. Discount as a function of η.
As for the seller, the computation of the expected profit
requires simulating an instance of the auction many times to
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Fig. 5. LSEs’ utility as a function of η.
find the expected compensation over independent runs of this
auction. We observe that budget balancedness is achieved
in expectation in Figure 6, where we compute the sample
averaged expected profit for different values of η when cˆ =
10/12 along with the corresponding lower bound.
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Fig. 6. Generator’s empirical average profit and lower bound on the profit
for cˆ = 10/12 as a function of η.
VI. CONCLUSION
Stochastic programming provides the generator with a
powerful tool to make reliable decisions regarding how much
electricity to contract for in the day ahead market even before
knowing the actual generation in the real time market. There
are many ways through which renewable electricity could be
priced in this case. Motivated by considerations in storage
and EV charging markets, we assumed a model in which
some loads are open to the possibility of not consuming
electricity at all if they are compensated appropriately. Using
valuation bids from the LSEs, we devise an allocation and a
corresponding payment scheme that yields not only truthful
bidding in dominant strategies, but satisfies efficiency, indi-
vidual rationality, and budget balancedness. Thus, we proved
that LSEs would voluntarily participate in the proposed
auction, and computed a lower bound on the profit of
the generator. Further, we conducted numerical simulations
under certain parametrized bids and with the assumption
that the renewable generation is distributed according to
Weibull distribution. The simulation results indicate that the
consumer surplus is positive (although, for some LSEs, they
are negligible), and the LSEs receive non-trivial discounts
for their consumption.
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
By substituting the expression in (8) in V (x) =
Eω[Q(x;w(ω))] and using the fact that the expectation of
the indicator function is just the probability of the condition
being true, we get
V (x) = Eω[Q(x;w(ω))] =
N∑
i=1
pii
[
P{kx(ω) > i}xi
+ P{kx(ω) = i}ϕi(x)
− Eω[w(ω)|kx(ω) = i]P{kx(ω) = i}
]
. (17)
To compute the probabilities in (17), we assume that wind
generation has a smooth and continuous cumulative distri-
bution function F (w) = P{w(ω) ≤ w} that is everywhere
differentiable. Using the definition of kx(ω) in (4), we get
P{kx(ω) = i} = P
{
ϕi+1(x) ≤ w(ω) < ϕi(x)
}
= F
(
ϕi(x)
)
− F
(
ϕi+1(x)
)
, (18)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , where we use the convention that a
summation with lower limit greater than the upper limit is
zero and F (0) = 0. Also,
P{kx(ω) > i} =
N∑
j=i+1
P{kx(ω) = j}
=
N∑
j=i+1
(
F
(
ϕj(x)
)− F (ϕj+1(x)))
= F (ϕi+1(x)), (19)
where all except the first term cancel each other out. Note
that P{kx(ω) > N} = 0. To evaluate the last probabilistic
term in (17), we use the function G, defined in (9). Now we
obtain the desired concise expression
Eω[w(ω)|kx(ω) = i]P{kx(ω) = i}
=
∫ ϕi(x)
ϕi+1(x)
w(ω)f(ω)dω = G
(
ϕi(x)
)−G(ϕi+1(x)),
(20)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ N . The expression in the lemma follows
immediately when we substitute (18), (19), and (20) in (17).
We now prove that V (x) is convex. Recall that Q(x;ω) =
piT y∗(x;ω). By evaluating this expression (given in Theorem
1, we conclude that y∗ is linear in w(ω).
We now show the convexity of Q(·, ω) for a realization
of the wind generation w(ω). Pick x1, x2 ∈ RN such that
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x1, x2 ≥ 0. Define y∗1 := y∗1(x1;ω) and y∗2 := y∗2(x2;ω) as
the optimal solutions associated with Q(x1;ω) and Q(x2;ω),
respectively, then the vector y = αy∗1 + (1 − α)y∗2 , where
α ∈ [0, 1], turns out to be a feasible vector that satisfies
the constraints of the optimization problem in (1) when x =
αx1 +(1−α)x2. Therefore, the value of the cost function at
y is greater than or equal to the optimal value Q(x;ω) and
the following equation proves convexity,
Q(x;ω) = Q(αx1 + (1− α)x2;ω)
≤ piT y
= piT (αy∗1 + (1− α)y∗2)
= αpiT y∗1 + (1− α)piT y∗2
= αQ(x1;ω) + (1− α)Q(x2;ω).
Indeed, the convexity of Eω[Q(x;ω)] follows immediately
by the linearity of the expectation operator, which preserves
convexity.
APPENDIX II
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Consider the optimality condition (12). We start from
the system of equations given in (13), which when solved
backwards starting from x∗N to x
∗
1 we get the results in (5)
and (6). It follows that
1) x∗N > 0⇒ cN−cN−1piN−piN−1 > 0⇒ cN > cN−1,
2) x∗i > 0⇒ ci−ci−1pii−pii−1 >
ci+1−ci
pii+1−pii ,
which is identical to (2) after rearrangement.
The converse is proved using backward induction. For i =
N , we have cN = cN−1 + (piN − piN−1)F (x∗N ). Hence, if
cN > cN−1 we have F (x∗N ) > 0 ⇒ x∗N > 0. Assume that
the statement holds for all i > n. For i = n, by rearranging
(2), we obtain ci−ci−1pii−pii−1 >
ci+1−ci
pii+1−pii , which, by monotonicity
of F , implies F−1
( ci−ci−1
pii−pii−1
)
> F−1
( ci+1−ci
pii+1−pii
)
. This further
yields x∗i > 0, by (5).
APPENDIX III
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Note ci−1 ≤ αi < s < βi < ci+1. We show ∂x
∗
i
∂s
is always positive in the interval (αi, βi), thereby showing
monotonicity of the allocation. First, note that ∂F
−1(z)
∂z =
1
f(z) . Using this, we get
∂x∗i
∂s
=
∂
∂s
F−1
(
s− ci−1
pii − pii−1
)
− ∂
∂s
F−1
(
ci+1 − s
pii+1 − pii
)
=
1
(pii − pii−1)
1
f
(
s−ci−1
pii−pii−1
)
+
1
(pii+1 − pii)
1
f
(
ci+1−s
pii+1−pii
) > 0,
which follows from the assumption pii−1 < pii < pii+1 and
f(z) > 0 for all z > 0. Now, for s ≤ αi, x∗i = 0 by Lemma
3 and s ≥ βi, the optimal allocation is infinite (which we
ruled out due to Assumption 1. The monotonicity of x∗N
follows as a special case of the proof above. The proof of
the lemma is thus complete.
APPENDIX IV
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
Note the following identity:∫ b
a
F−1(z)dz =
∫ F−1(b)
F−1(a)
F−1(F (w))f(w)dw
= G(F−1(b))−G(F−1(a)),
where we changed the variable z = F (w) and used the
invertibility of F . Using this identity, we carry out the
integral equation for p∗i for 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1 in Figure 7.
The derivation for p∗N is also analogous.
We next prove the incentive compatibility by showing that
the utility of each LSE, i, has a unique maximum at the true
value ci, regardless of what other buyers announce. Fix c−i.
The utility of the player is
Ui(s, c−i) = cix∗i (s, c−i)− pi(s, c−i)
By differentiating the utility with respect to s, we get
dUi
ds
= ci
dx∗i
ds
− sdx
∗
i
ds
,
This derivative is zero when s = ci. Thus, s = ci satisfies the
first order necessary for maximization of the utility function.
To show that the utility is indeed maximized at this point,
we prove that the utility function is increasing on the interval
(0, ci) and decreasing on (ci, βi). For s ∈ (0, ci),
dUi
ds
= (ci − s)dx
∗
i
ds
> 0,
by Lemma 4 and ci > s. Therefore, Ui(·, c−i) is increasing
in this interval. On the other hand, for s ∈ (ci, βi),
dUi
ds
= (ci − s)dx
∗
i
ds
< 0,
by Lemma 4 and ci < s. Thus, Ui(·, c−i) is decreasing over
this region.
Since i was picked arbitrarily, the result holds for all i.
Thus, we conclude that it is in the best interest for each
LSE to be truthful in their bids. Moreover, truthful bidding
strategy is always the best response regardless of what other
players bid (as long as the constraints on ci are met to ensure
that the solution to (1) is well-defined).
APPENDIX V
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In order to prove individual rationality of our mechanism,
we need the following lemma.
Lemma 11: G ◦ F−1 : [0, 1) → [0,∞) is a convex
monotonically increasing function.
Proof: We have
G(F−1(x)) =
∫ x
0
F−1(z)dz.
Differentiating the function once yields
d
dx
G(F−1(x)) = F−1(x).
9
p∗i (ci, c−i) =
∫ ci
0
s
d
ds
x∗i (s, c−i)ds =
∫ ci
αi
s
d
ds
x∗i (s, c−i)ds
=
1
(pii − pii−1)
∫ ci
αi
s
f
(
s−ci−1
pii−pii−1
)ds+ 1
(pii+1 − pii)
∫ ci
αi
s
f
(
ci+1−s
pii+1−pii
)ds
=
1
(pii − pii−1)
[
(pii − pii−1)sF−1
(
s− ci−1
pii − pii−1
)
− (pii − pii−1)
∫
F−1
(
s− ci−1
pii − pii−1
)
ds
]∣∣∣∣ci
αi
− 1
(pii+1 − pii)
[
(pii+1 − pii)sF−1
(
ci+1 − s
pii+1 − pii
)
− (pii+1 − pii)
∫
F−1
(
ci+1 − s
pii+1 − pii
)
ds
]∣∣∣∣ci
αi
=
[
sF−1
(
s− ci−1
pii − pii−1
)
− (pii − pii−1)G
(
F−1
(
s− ci−1
pii − pii−1
))]∣∣∣∣ci
αi
−
[
sF−1
(
ci+1 − s
pii+1 − pii
)
+ (pii+1 − pii)G
(
F−1
(
ci+1 − s
pii+1 − pii
))]∣∣∣∣ci
αi
= ci
[
F−1
(
ci − ci−1
pii − pii−1
)
− F−1
(
ci+1 − ci
pii+1 − pii
)]
+ (pii+1 − pii−1)G
(
F−1
(
ci+1 − ci−1
pii+1 − pii−1
))
− (pii+1 − pii)G
(
F−1
(
ci+1 − ci
pii+1 − pii
))
− (pii − pii−1)G
(
F−1
(
ci − ci−1
pii − pii−1
))
.
Fig. 7. See Appendix IV. Here, we used integration by parts after the fourth equality.
p∗i (ci, c−i)− E [piiy∗i (x∗;ω)]
= cix
∗
i + (pii+1 − pii−1)G
(
F−1(ρcvxi)
)− (pii+1 − pii)G(F−1(ρ1i))− (pii − pii−1)G(F−1(ρ2i))
− piix∗iF
(
F−1(ρ1i)
)− piiF−1(ρ2i)[F (F−1(ρ2i))− F (F−1(ρ1i))]+ piiG(F−1(ρ2i))− piiG(F−1(ρ1i)),
= (ci − piiρ1i)x∗i + pii+1
[
G
(
F−1(ρcvxi)
)−G(F−1(ρ1i))]+ pii−1[G(F−1(ρ2i))−G(F−1(ρcvxi))]
− piiF−1(ρ2i)(ρ2i − ρ1i),
≥ (ci − piiρ1i)x∗i + pii+1(ρcvxi − ρ1i)F−1(ρ1i) + pii−1(ρ2i − ρcvxi)F−1(ρcvxi)− piiF−1(ρ2i)(ρ2i − ρ1i)
= (ci − piiρ1i)x∗i − pii(ρ2i − ρ1i)x∗i + pii−1(1− µi)(ρ2i − ρ1i)(F−1(ρcvxi)− F−1(ρ1i))
= pii
( ci
pii
− ρ2i
)
x∗i + pii−1
(ci − αi)
pii − pii−1 (F
−1(ρcvxi)− F−1(ρ1i)).
Fig. 8. See Appendix VI. Here, the first inequality comes from convexity of G ◦ F−1.
Taking another differentiation, we get
d2
dx2
G(F−1(x)) =
d
dx
F−1(x) =
1
f(x)
> 0.
This proves the result.
Using this lemma, we can show that the sum of the three
last terms in (14) is negative.
Note that,
ci+1 − ci−1
pii+1 − pii−1 =
pii+1 − pii
pii+1 − pii−1
ci+1 − ci
pii+1 − pii
+
pii − pii−1
pii+1 − pii−1
ci − ci−1
pii − pii−1 . (21)
This expression coupled with the result in Lemma 11 yields:
(pii+1 − pii−1)G
(
F−1
(
ci+1 − ci−1
pii+1 − pii−1
))
≤ (pii+1 − pii)G
(
F−1
(
ci+1 − ci
pii+1 − pii
))
+ (pii − pii−1)G
(
F−1
(
ci − ci−1
pii − pii−1
))
.
Substituting this inequality in (14) implies,
p∗i (ci, c−i) ≤ cix∗i (ci, c−i),
for 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1. This result is also true for i = N since
a positive term is subtracted from cNx∗N (cN , c−N ) in (15).
APPENDIX VI
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We break the process of bounding U∗0 into multiple steps.
We start by first evaluating E [y∗i (x
∗;ω)] in the following
lemma.
Lemma 12: The expected value of the optimal recourse
10
variable, y∗i (x;ω) is given by
E [y∗i (x;ω)] = xiF
(
ϕi+1(x)
)
+ ϕi(x)F
(
ϕi(x)
)
− ϕi(x)F
(
ϕi+1(x)
)−G(ϕi(x))
+G
(
ϕi+1(x)
)
. (22)
Proof: By combining (3) and (4) we get
y∗i (x;ω) =

xi w(ω) < ϕi+1(x)
ϕi(x)− w(ω) ϕi+1(x) ≤ w(ω) < ϕi(x)
0 else
,
for all i, where ϕN+1(x) = 0. The expectation with respect
to the generation can be computed as follows:
E [y∗i (x;ω)] =
∫ ϕi+1(x)
0
xif(ω)dω
+
∫ ϕi(x)
ϕi+1(x)
(ϕi(x)− w(ω))f(ω)dω
= xiF (ϕi+1(x)) + ϕi(x)
[
F (ϕi(x))
− F (ϕi+1(x))
]
−G(ϕi(x)) +G(ϕi+1(x)).
The proof of this lemma is complete.
Before stating our bound for p∗i −pi∗iE [y∗i (x∗;ω)], we define
the variables, ρ1, ρcvx, ρ2 and µi in the following set of
equations,
ρcvxi =
ci+1 − ci−1
pii+1 − pii−1 , ρ1i =
ci+1 − ci
pii+1 − pii ,
ρ2i =
ci − ci−1
pii − pii−1 , µi =
pii − pii−1
pii+1 − pii−1 . (23)
where ρcvxi = (1 − µi)ρ1i + µiρ2i , by (21). We have the
following facts:
(ρcvxi − ρ1i) = µi(ρ2i − ρ1i)
(ρ2i − ρcvxi) = (1− µi)(ρ2i − ρ1i)
=
(ci − αi)
pii − pii−1
pii = pii+1µi + pii−1(1− µi)
which yields
pii+1(ρcvxi − ρ1i) + pii−1(ρ2i − ρcvxi) = pii(ρ2i − ρ1i).
(24)
For the N th LSE, when F (x) is convex over (0, x∗N ), then
F−1(ρ) is concave over (0, ρ2N ) and the area under F
−1(ρ)
over this interval can be bounded by the area of the right
triangle connecting the points (0, 0), (0, ρ2N ), and(ρ2N , x
∗
N ).
Therefore, by (15) and (22), we get
p∗N (cN , c−N )− E [piNy∗N (x∗;ω)] = cNx∗N + piN−1G(x∗N )
− piN cN − cN−1
piN − piN−1x
∗
N ,
≥ cNx∗N +
1
2
piN−1
cN − cN−1
piN − piN−1x
∗
N − piN
cN − cN−1
piN − piN−1x
∗
N ,
= piN
(
cN
piN
− cN − cN−1
piN − piN−1
)
x∗N +
1
2
piN−1
cN − cN−1
piN − piN−1x
∗
N ,
=
[
cN−1
piN
piN − piN−1 −
cN + cN−1
2
piN−1
piN − piN−1
]
x∗N .
The proof of the lemma is complete.
APPENDIX VII
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First, we note that since ci > αi, we have
ci+1 − ci−1
pii+1 − pii−1 −
ci+1 − ci
pii+1 − pii > 0.
Coupled with the fact that F−1 is monotonically increasing
function, we conclude that[
F−1
( ci+1 − ci−1
pii+1 − pii−1
)
− F−1
( ci+1 − ci
pii+1 − pii
)]
> 0.
Now, if ci/pii < ci−1/pii−1, then
ci
pii
>
ci − ci−1
pii − pii−1 =⇒ ci − piiF (ϕi(x
∗) > 0,
where we used (13). From Lemma 9, we conclude that the
lower bound is positive. This further implies that U∗0 > 0,
which completes the proof of the lemma.
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